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1. Introduction
I have recently analyzed several simple transfer (i.e. tax-and-pension) models (some-
times written with coauthors) almost independently of each other. Simple means here
utmost simplicity: everything is neglected what can be neglected. Having completed
their analyses, the joint features of the models became much clearer. (i) Though they
follow the logic of the Overlapping Generations model (cf. Weil, 2008), they are basi-
cally static, i.e. they only consider a population consisting of people born in the same
time period (year). (ii) They assume away the changes in wages and pensions occurring
during the two life stages. (iii) The population is heterogeneous, the types’ earnings or
discount factors are different. (iv) The rules of the transfer system strongly influence
individual behavior, based on maximization of discounted utility: labor supply, saving
at young age, report on earnings etc. (v) The paternalistic government determines the
transfer rules by maximizing an undiscounted social welfare function.1
Of course, these models were not the first ones of this type. Nevertheless, I give a sur-
vey of them. For reference points, I single out three such models which preceded mines:
Feldstein (1985), (1987) (twins) and Cremer, De Donder, Maldonaldo and Pestieau
(2008).2 I only mention few related but complex models which have dynamic and
detailed age-structures: Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Fehr and Habermann (2008),
Sefton, van de Ven and Weale (2008).3 It is of interest that the complex models gener-
ally neglect myopia (for an exception, Fehr and Kindermann, 2010). Note that all these
models overlooked the complex formulation of mechanism design invented by Mirrlees
(1971) and treated in an introductory way by Diamond (2003) in a two-generation
framework.
Table 1 surveys the types of assumptions of the foregoing models. The order of
discussion follows the order of complexity. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to my
models and the underlying assumptions by keywords. To avoid any confusion, however,
I give here their resolutions.
I start with the models’ abbreviations. Voluntary pension: Simonovits (2009a) and
(2011b), cap on contributions: Simonovits (2012a) and (2013), labor supply: Simonovits
(2012d), wage reporting: Simonovits (2009b), pension credit: Simonovits (2012c). Con-
tinuing with the assumptions; labor supply: labor supply is flexible; wage report: the
reported earnings are endogenous; saving: there exist positive private life-cycle savings
(with or without tax favors), nonlinearity: mostly piecewise linearity; tax: in addition
to pension contribution, there is a personal income tax. Sign + stands for a property
present or endogenous; sign – stands for a property missing or exogenous. (In contrast
to some authors, negative savings are excluded!)
1 For the pros and cons of paternalism, see e.g. Sunstein and Thaler (2003) and Epstein (2007),
respectively.
2 Cremer and Pestieau (2011) surveyed the whole field.
3 Andersen (2012) is an interesting crossover being a simple dynamic model, investigating the
question of more saving or later retirement is better against population aging. Varian (1980) is a
simple static model covering the issue of social insurance.
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Table 1. Models and assumptions
Assumptions Labor Wage Nonlin-
supply report Saving earity Tax
Models
Feldstein – – + + –
Cremer et al. + – + – –
Voluntary pension – – + + +
Cap on contribution – – + + –
Labor supply + – – – +
Report – + + – –
Pension credit + – + + –
At surveying the results, I pay little attention to the specific issues, rather I con-
centrate on the similarities. Nevertheless, it is worth summarizing in a nutshell the
messages of the specific models and sometimes illustrating their weights by Hungarian
or international data.
a) The voluntary pension system complements or supplements a mandatory one.
Taking into account the arising tax expenditures, the voluntary system is not as attrac-
tive as is frequently depicted. Among others, Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996); Baily and
Kirkegard (2009, 452–461) emphasize the illusory effects of savings incentives.4
b) The cap on the pension contribution base is quite neglected in the literature.
Barr and Diamond (2008, p. 63) list two functions: (i) In a proportional system, the
government has no mandate to force high old-age consumption on high-earners. (ii) In
a progressive system, the cap limits the redistribution from the rich to the poor. Others
discuss a third function: to limit the perverse redistribution from the poor to the rich
caused by the strong correlation between lifetime earning and life expectancy. We add
a fourth one: the cap reduces the effective contribution rate of those who earn above
the cap and thus making room for the presumably more efficient private savings.5
c) Designing an optimal transfer system, the elasticity of labor supply plays a key
role. First, it limits the scope of redistribution; second, at least in our model, ensuring
old-age living standard has a priority over the earning redistribution. (Disney (2004)
thoroughly analyzes the redistribution in various public pension systems.) Nevertheless,
the impact of elasticity of labor supply is a hotly debated issue. We only mention that
the Czech Republic, which is quite similar to Hungary in many respects, is able to
operate a strongly redistributive pension system without having significant other pillars
(see also underreported earnings below).
4 For example, in Hungary, in 2009 the voluntary contributions—mostly paid by the well-to-do—
amounted only to 0.3 percent of the GDP but requested a 50 percent matching rate. (For comparison,
the mandatory pension expenditures were about 10 percent of the GDP in 2009.)
5 The example of Hungary is illuminating: Between 1992 and 2012 the relative value of the cap
oscillated between a high 3 and a low 1.6. Since 2013, there is no cap and the benefit has become
unlimited as well, creating unwanted tensions and reducing the long-run welfare around 0.7 percent in
our model.
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d) In the wage reporting model, the unobservable tax morale explains the variation
of reported income regardless of the tax rate and the probability of audits and fees (Frey
and Weck-Hannemann, 1984).6 Our discussion extends the validity of the tax model
(e.g. Simonovits, 2011a) to the pension system.7 The basic insight is intuitive: the
higher the tax morale, the more redistributive the socially optimal transfer system.
e) Rather than choosing between two rigid schemes, namely the flat and the means-
tested ones, a lot of countries have been applying the pension credit system. Sefton
et al. model the corresponding British system. For example, raising the value of the
basic benefits and withdrawing 50 percent of the proportional benefits from the basic
pension, the poorest pensioners’ standard of living could be increased without burdening
the budget with a uniform basic pension.
Finally we must mention the missing topic of mandatory private pension systems.
For a number of works (e.g. World Bank, 1994), this is the most important issue of the
pension reforms. Though the early work of Barr (1979) had already exposed the theo-
retical flaws of this approach, only the recent international financial crisis demonstrated
the practical problems of such a system and of the transition leading to it.8
Having listed these models, a natural question arises: Why do I not unify all these
simple models into one? My answer is as follows: The unification would only complicate
the model without bringing us too much closer to the reality; dynamics would still be
missing, the age-dependence of earnings and of pensions would still be neglected.
The negation of dynamics is especially hurting: a) the contradiction between popula-
tion aging and productivity rise is left out; b) the adverse impact of erratically changing
government policies (e.g. in Hungary as well as in Great Britain) on the incentive
schemes is overlooked; and c) it is impossible to model the transition from one system
into another within our two-generation framework. Finally we allude to an alternative
of the welfare approach, namely the political economy (cf. Casamatta, Cremer and
Pestieau, 2000).
The structure of the remaining part is as follows: Section 2 analyzes three intro-
ductory examples: (i) the limits on redistribution with flexible labor supply without
old-age consumption; (ii) the relation of the insufficient private saving and the manda-
tory pension system of a representative agent; (iii) the practical impossibility of full
intra- and intergenerational redistribution. Section 3 presents the general framework.
Section 4 outlines the specific pension models mentioned above. Section 5 returns to
the basic specifications in the original papers: discounted Leontief utility function and
the continuous Pareto earnings distribution, applied to the calculation of the optimal
contribution rate and of the cap; and the pension credit. (An additional gain is that
comparing Sections 4 and 5 underlines the excessive sensitivity of our results to appar-
ently unessential details.) Section 6 draws the conclusions. At the end of the paper a
list contains the notations.
6 An alternative approach is the elasticity of taxable income, for the latest survey, see Saez, Slemrod
and Giertz (2012).
7 As a detour, let us call the reader’s attention to two related works: Garay, Simonovits and To´th
(2011) analyzed the dynamics of tax declaration with the traditional methods, while Me´der, Simonovits
and Vincze (2012) did the same with the new tools of agent-based modeling.
8 As an afterthought, I mention van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) whose static protomodel
considers the problem of optimal saving and fertility in a similar framework.
3
2. Introductory examples
As an introduction into models of the transfer systems, we consider the three simplest
paternalistic models: one for income redistribution, another for pension and a third for
their unification.
2.1. Income redistribution with flexible labor supply
We consider a static model (cf. Simonovits, 2012b) for income redistribution with more
than one type. To make the model as simple as possible, we confine our attention to
the personal income tax and neglect any other tax or pension. Let w be the total wage
(or full compensation) rate of a certain type of workers, T be his annual (or life) time
limit, l be his corresponding labor supply, 0 < l < T , then wl is his earning. Let θ be
the personal income tax rate (representing all other taxes as well), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and γ be
the basic income. His consumption is equal to
c = γ + (1− θ)wl.
We turn to the determination of the optimal labor supply. The simplest utility
function is copied from Doerrenberg, Duncan, Fuest and Peichl (2012):
U(w, c, l) = c+
1
2
wl2.
Substituting the formula of the consumption into the utility function, we arrive at
the reduced utility function with parameter w and variable l:
U∗(w, l) = γ + (1− θ)wl − 1
2
wl2.
Take the value of the basic income as given. Due to the strict concavity of U∗,
the optimal labor supply is determined as a root of the marginal utility–labor supply
function:
0 = U∗
′
l (w, l) = (1− θ)w − wl.
We have arrived to
Lemma 1. The optimal labor supply and the utility function are equal to
l∗ = 1− θ and U∗(w, l∗) = γ + 1
2
w(1− θ)2.
Ceteris paribus, the optimal labor supply is independent of the wage rate and of the
basic income and is a decreasing function of the tax rate.
Having determined the individual optima, we turn to the macrorelations. Denoting
expectation over the wage distribution by E, and choosing an appropriate unit of mea-
surement, the average wage rate can be taken unity: E(w) = 1. Then the tax balance
is given by
γ = θE(wl∗) = θ(1− θ).
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To determine the socially optimal tax system, we shall use the simplest social wel-
fare function, namely the Rawlsian one which is the minimum of the individual utility
functions: V (θ) = minw U∗(w, l∗). Denoting the lowest wage rate by wL ∈ (0, 1), it is
easy to see that
V (θ) = θ(1− θ) + 1
2
wL(1− θ)2 = 12wL + (1− wL)θ −
(
1− 1
2
wL
)
θ2.
Since the socially optimal tax rate satisfies the necessary first-order condition: 0 =
V ′(θ∗) = 1− wL − θ(2− wL), we have
Theorem 1. The Rawlsian optimal tax rate is equal to
θ∗ =
1− wL
2− wL <
1
2
.
It is not enough to determine the social optimum, we must evaluate the efficiency
gain having an optimal tax system with respect to having a suboptimal one or no tax
system. Since the numerical value of V has no direct meaning, we define the relative
efficiency e of θ∗ with respect to θ = 0 as follows. Multiplying the earnings by a positive
scalar e such that the social welfare of the no tax system is the same as the social welfare
of the optimal tax with the original wages. Denoting the dependence of the welfare on
the (average) wage e, we have the following definition for efficiency:
V [e, 0] = V [1, θ∗].
By simple calculations,
V [e, 0] =
1
2
ewL and V [1, θ∗] =
1
2(2− wL) ,
hence the relative efficiency is equal to
e =
1
wL(2− wL) > 1.
This is as expected: the lower the minimal wage rate, the higher the relative efficiency
of the optimal tax system to the no tax.
We have paid a high price for getting an explicit formula: (i) the utilitarian social
welfare function EU∗ would yield zero optimal tax rate; (ii) total redistribution (θ = 1)
would imply zero labor supply (l∗ = 0); (iii) in the two-period model of the next
subsection, the linear consumption utility would make perfect substitution between the
young- and the old-age consumption, undermining the pension problem. As a way out,
in Section 4, we shall consider the appropriate generalization of the Cobb–Douglas-
utility functions of the form
U(w, c, l) = log c+ ξ log[w(T − l)],
where T ≥ 1 is the time limit and ξ ≥ 0 is the relative labor disutility coefficient.
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2.2. Paternalistic pension system
Following Feldstein (1985, first case), the whole society is represented by a single in-
dividual, living for two periods. Let c and d be the young- and old-age consumption,
respectively, and δ be the discount factor, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The individual has a Cobb–
Douglas lifetime utility function
U(c, d) = log c+ δ log d.
The individual only works in the first period, his earning is 1 and saves s. In the second
period he enjoys the fruits of his savings, ρs, where ρ ≥ 1 is the interest factor. Denoting
the dependence on the discount factor by a subindex δ, the reduced utility function is
U∗δ (s) = log(1− s) + δ log(ρs).
To maximize this utility, he chooses such a saving at which the marginal lifetime utility
(denoted by prime) becomes zero:
U∗′δ(s) = −
1
1− s +
δρ
ρs
= 0, i.e. sδ =
1
1 + δ−1
≤ 1
2
.
Note that here the Cobb–Douglas utility function is degenerated, because the optimal
saving is independent of the interest factor.
Then the optimal consumption pair are equal to
cδ =
δ−1
1 + δ−1
and dδ =
ρ
1 + δ−1
.
We specify the old-age consumption for two special interest factors (0 < δ < 1):
dδ =
1
1 + δ−1
< cδ if ρ = 1
and
dδ =
δ−1
1 + δ−1
= cδ if ρ = δ−1.
Let us assume that 1 < ρ < 1/δ and the paternalistic government does not accept
the shortsightedness, i.e. undersaving. Then it replaces the private saving sδ by a
paternalistic mandatory retirement contribution τ yielding old-age benefit τ . There is
no discounting in the paternalistic utility function (therefore δ is replaced by 1 in the
subindex):
V1[τ ] = log(1− τ) + log τ.
The socially optimal contribution rate now is determined by
V ′1 [τ ] = −
1
1− τ +
1
τ
= 0, i.e. τ1 =
1
2
.
It is evident that in this model, the pension system achieves a higher saving than
the private scheme does: τ1 > sδ. But the relevant question sounds as follows: for
what parameter values (δ, ρ) is the pension system superior to the saving scheme in
the paternalistic framework? The paternalistic welfare values of the two schemes are
respectively
U∗1 (sδ) = log(1− sδ) + log(ρsδ) and V1[τ1] = log(1− τ1) + log τ1.
It is relatively straightforward to verify that U∗1 (sδ) is an increasing function of δ.
Then a simple calculation yields
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Theorem 2. For any discount factor 0 < δ < 1, there exists a critical interest factor
ρδ, 1 < ρδ < 1/δ such that the private scheme is better/worse than the public one if
the interest factor is above/below the critical value:
U∗1 (sδ) < V1[τ1] if ρ < ρδ
and
U∗1 (sδ) > V1[τ1] if ρ > ρδ.
In words: in the representative agent’s saving model, the introduction of a mandatory
pension system can be justified if and only if the efficiency of the private system is limited
with respect to the shortsightedness. Evidently, the higher the discount factor, the lower
the critical interest factor below which paternalism is needed.
Notwithstanding all deficiencies of the model, it is worth demonstrating numerically
how the critical value depends on the discount factor. Considering 30-year-long life-
stages, our illustration applies only annual factors, derived from
δ(1) = δ1/30 and ρ(1) = ρ1/30.
For example, in the first line of Table 2, the annual discount rate of 5 percent defines
a critical interest rate of 1.8 percent, and the ratio of old- to young-age consumption is
equal to 0.37. But raising the discount rate, the critical interest rate quickly converges
to zero and the consumption ratio slowly approximates 1.
Table 2. Autonomy and paternalism, annual factors
Critical Young- Old-
Discount interest age age
factor factor c o n s u m p t i o n
δ(1) ρδ(1)(1) c∗δ d
∗
δ
0.95 1.018 0.823 0.304
0.96 1.012 0.773 0.324
0.97 1.007 0.714 0.350
0.98 1.003 0.647 0.387
0.99 1.001 0.575 0.435
1.00 1.000 0.500 0.500
Remark. In the socially optimal mandatory pension system, c1 = 0.5 and d1 = 0.5.
2.3. Total intra- and intergenerational redistribution
At the end of this Section, unifying and simplifying the previous two models, we outline
the model of Marxian communism: for inflexible labor supply and zero interest rate,
full income redistribution is socially optimal. We do not need formulas: all incomes are
taxed away and everybody receives the same transfer; the workers as tax returns and
the pensioners as basic benefit.
These models are extremely simple, because they neglect at least one of the following
complications: the intertemporality/heterogeneity of the population, the flexibility of
labor supply and the possibility of underreporting earnings. Before entering the dis-
cussion of these problems, we outline a general framework, assuming individuals with
differing wage rates, discount factors etc.
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3. General model
We distinguish the micro and the macro sides. The primitive quantities appearing in
the model are generally positive (possibly zeros) and the functions are smooth. We
assume that the population as well as the economy is stationary, moreover, there is no
inflation.
3.1. Micromodel
Let vector p of dimension n+1 denote the individual characteristics of a person (e.g. his
wage rate, discount factor etc.). Let vector q of dimension N denote the characteristics
of the government transfer system (e.g. contribution rate, accrual rate etc.). The
employee works for a unit period and then is retired for another period, with length µ,
0 < µ ≤ 1. His young-age consumption is c, his per-period old-age consumption is d.
(Unlike in Subsection 2.2, at this stage we depart from the widespread but superfluous
practice of identifying the lengths of the two periods in static models.) These variables
depend on his decision vector x of dimension k. In the special models, the decisions are
savings (including tax favored ones), labor supply and reported earnings.
Since one of the main reasons of having a mandatory retirement system is the indi-
viduals’ shortsightedness, we single out the discount factor δ of the general characters,
having thus p = (p, δ), where p is an n-vector. Then it is worthwhile distinguishing
the per-period young- and old-age utility functions u1(p, q, x, c) and u2(p, q, x, d). The
lifetime utility function is
U(p, δ, q, x, c, d) = u1(p, q, x, c) + µδu2(p, q, x, d).
In our abstract model, we have the following connection between the decision x and the
feasible consumption pair:
c = c(p, δ, q, x) and d = d(p, δ, q, x).
For example, since the government operates with a contribution rate τ , out of the full
wage w only the net wage (1− τ)w flows into the young-age consumption. This can be
further diminished by taking into account the restrained labor supply l(< 1) to (1−τ)wl.
The old-age consumption, in turn, primarily depends on the pension benefits: γ + βwl.
In addition, if the government subsidizes a voluntary pension scheme through a matching
rate ϕ and finances the scheme by an earmarked tax with rate θ, then the subsidized
saving r, the unsubsidized saving s and the earmarked tax θwl also reduce young-age
consumption by r+s+θwl and increase the old-age consumption by µ−1ρ[s+(1+ϕ)r],
where ρ is the interest factor. In the more sophisticated models, for given consumption,
the young-age per-period utility is lower than its old-age counterpart, the difference
being the labor disutility h(1− l).
Here we introduce the composite n+1+N -dimensional vector of individual and the
government characteristics P = (p, δ, q). Substituting the two consumption functions
into the lifetime utility function yields the reduced utility function:
U∗(P, x) = U(P, x, c(P, x), d(P, x)).
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Following the neoclassical theory, we assume that every individual takes the govern-
ment transfer system as given and maximizes his reduced utility function with respect
to x:
U∗(P, x)→ max .
Then we have
Theorem 3. a) For the locally optimal decision function x(P ), condition
U∗′x(P, x) = 0
holds.
b) Assume that the k-order square matrix U∗′′xx is strictly negative definite, then
the matrix of rates of marginal change of x(P ) is
x′(P ) = [U∗′′xx]
−1U∗′′xP .
We shall need the balance function of the individuals, denoted by T (P, x). This
determines the balance of the contributions and the benefits of type (p, δ) at the transfer
system q.
The neutral system, where the balance is identically zero: T (P, x) ≡ 0, is theoreti-
cally interesting. Then the socially suboptimal decision xN(P ) satisfies L′x = 0, where
the individual Lagrange-function is
L(P, x) = U∗(P, x)− λ(P )T (P, x)
and λ(P ) is the appropriate Lagrange multiplier.
3.2. Macromodel
Until now we have only considered a single type with given individual characteristics p
and δ and government characteristics q. Now we introduce the heterogeneity of types.
Let E be the operator of expectation of the individual types (typically of wages and
discount factors). Then the balance of the transfer system can be formulated as
ET (P, x(P )) = 0.
Note that this is already a general equilibrium model, where individual decisions
depend on the transfer system and the balance of the latter also depends on the former.
In certain models, there is only a single transfer system (namely, the public pension)
but in others, the tax system also appears. It is a question of choice to have either a
unified or separated balances.
In our framework, the government maximizes a paternalistic social welfare function,
where the individual discount factors are replaced by 1 and the transfer system is bal-
anced. Also, the individual utility functions can be transformed by an increasing and
concave function ψ, making the social welfare function progressive:
V (q) = Eψ[U∗(p, 1, q, x(p, δ, q))].
If ψ(U) ≡ U , then we receive pure utilitarianism.
Then the government chooses a vector of transfer characteristics q∗ such that V (q) is
maximal with respect to the balance equation(s). Again considering a local maximum,
and relying on the method of Lagrange multiplier, we have
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Theorem 4. A necessary first-order condition for a social optimum is
L′q = E
[
ψ′(U∗)
dU∗
dq
(p, 1, q, x(p, δ, q))
]
− νEdT
dq
(p, δ, q, x(p, δ, q)) = 0
and ET (p, δ, q, x(p, δ, q)) = 0.
Remarks. 1. It is clear that for an N -vector q we have N independent scalar
equations and ν is also an N -vector.
2. Note the contradiction between individual myopia and paternalism: V has para-
meter values 1 and δ at the same time.
Comparing the social welfare provided by two transfer systems A and B, we cannot
rely on the numerical values of the social optima, since the utility functions’ scales
are also arbitrary. As in Subsection 2.1 above, we shall use an indirect method for
comparison. Let e be a positive scalar and VX(e) be the social welfare assured by
system X when all wages (rates) are uniformly multiplied by e. Then the efficiency of
system A is e times that of B if VB(e) = VA(1).
What problems can be investigated with the help of such a family of models? A
skeptic might say that such stylized models are useless. Luckily there are such or even
more stylized models—or families of models—which give rise to strong conclusions.
At least such models are able refute certain qualitatively wrong ideas. For example,
neutral systems are typically socially inferior to redistributive ones. On the other hand,
excessive redistribution may undermine the efficiency of transfers so much that even the
preferred types suffer from redistribution. In Sections 4 and 5 only specific models will
be analyzed.
4. Specific models
In this Section we outline the specific models, transformed into an approximately com-
mon form. Because of the lack of illuminating analytical results, we must often rely on
numerical illustrations, and generally we rest satisfied with two types: denoted by L(ow)
and H(igh). We have wages wL < wH , the types’ shares are fL and fH with fL+fH = 1.
The average wage rate is 1, implying wH = (1 − fLwL)/fH . (Note, however, the con-
tinuous wage distribution in Subsection 5.2 below). In the two-overlapping-generation
models, numerically we work with µ = 1/2, i.e. the retirement period’s length is half of
the working period.
Just as a warming-up, we return to the socially optimal contribution rate (of Sub-
section 2.2), when saving is zero and µ ceases to be 1. Now
V1[τ ] = log(1− τ) + µ log(µ−1τ).
Therefore the socially optimal contribution rate is determined by
V ′1 [τ ] = −
1
1− τ +
µ
τ
= 0, i.e. τ¯ =
1
1 + µ−1
.
If τ > τ¯ , then d > c, excess to be excluded. We shall call τ¯ maximal, corresponding to the
perfectly far-sighted worker’s optimal saving rate. The corresponding net replacement
rate is unitary: c = d.
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4.1. Voluntary pension system
We start with the simplest special model, namely the interaction of mandatory and
voluntary pension systems. The basic idea is simple: in economics, it is a commonplace
that voluntary participation is generally better than mandatory one. But we have al-
ready shown in Subsection 2.2 that in the case of life-cycle saving of myopic workers,
some coercion may be needed. One hopes that this can be minimized, for example, by
introducing voluntary pensions. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the tax expen-
diture on tax-favored voluntary pension systems, then the attractiveness of this form is
greatly diminished. Perhaps the existence of a cap on voluntary pension contributions
already signals this effect.
As outlined in the introduction to the general framework, there is a worker earning
wage w who pays a mandatory pension contribution τw and will receive a proportional
benefit b = µ−1τw when retired. In addition to this mandatory transfer, there is
a possibility to contribute r to a voluntary system, matched by a factor ϕ by the
government up to the cap r¯. If the worker wants to save even more, he can save s
without getting any matching. The factor of return to these private savings is ρ, i.e.
the old-age consumption becomes
d = µ−1[τw + ρ{(1 + ϕ)r + s}].
Note, however, that this matching must be covered by proportional earmarked taxes,
θw. Therefore the worker’s consumption reduces to
c = w − (τ + θ)w − r − s.
In this Section we neglect the real interest rate: ρ = 1 and work with CRRA rather
than Cobb–Douglas-utility function: u(c) = σ−1cσ, where σ < 0. (For σ = 0, we would
obtain the log-utility function! Note that in Subsection 2.2, the optimal saving sδ was
independent of the interest factor ρ, showing degeneracy!) Then for positive savings,
the optimal consumption pair satisfy
d = cD(δ, ϕ), where D(δ, ϕ) = [δ(1 + ϕ)]1/(1−σ).
For zero saving, d > cD(δ, ϕ).
We assume that the lower paid have a lower discount factor than the higher paid
have:
0 ≤ δL < δH ≤ 1.
We have two balance equations.
Pension balance:
µβEw = τEw, i.e. τ = µβ.
Earmarked tax balance:
ϕEr = θEw.
It is evident that no rational worker would save normally before exhausting the
possibilities of voluntary contributions in [0, r¯].
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We compare three idealized systems: (i) the purely mandatory system, (ii) the asym-
metric system, where only the far-sighted participate and (iii) the symmetric system,
where both types participate proportionally to their wages. We shall see that the sym-
metric system is socially superior to both the pure mandatory system and the asym-
metric one, which in turn are roughly equivalent.
To save space, here we only discuss the asymmetric voluntary system, and confine
attention to a single case from Theorem 3 of Simonovits (2009). As a preparation, let us
denote δo the government implicit discount factor, implying the mandatory contribution
rate τ , as an individual optimum (τ = sδo). Then let ϕL be that positive scalar, for
which δL(1 + ϕL) = δo, i.e. that matching rate at which type L is just without a
voluntary contribution.
Theorem 5. If the matching rate is low enough, 0 < ϕ ≤ ϕL and the cap on
voluntary contribution is high enough:
r¯ > rH(ϕ) =
[D(δH , ϕ)(1− τ)− µ−1τ ]wH
D(δH , ϕ)(1 + fHϕwH) + (1 + ϕ)µ−1
,
then type H’s optimal contribution is equal to rH(ϕ), while sH = 0.
To illustrate our findings numerically, we choose σ = −1, δL = 0.15; δH = 0.5
(annually δL(1) = 0.939; δH(1) = 0.977). The government contribution rate τ =
0.183 corresponds to a medium discount factor δo = 0.2 (annually δo(1) = 0.948). To
have simple algebra, the cap in each voluntary system is to be equal to H’s voluntary
contribution (italicized in Table 3). To amplify the effects, we choose a rather unequal
wage distribution: fL = 2/3 and fH = 1/3 with wL = 0.5 and wH = 2. Table 3 presents
a numerical illustration.
Table 3. Comparison of combinations of mandatory and voluntary pensions
Voluntary Traditi- Volun-
contri- onal Worker Pensioner tary Relative
Earning bution saving c o n s u m p t i o n transfer efficiency
wi ri s
o
i c
o
i d
o
i T
o
i e
Pure mandatory system (ϕ = 0) 1
0.5 0 0 0.409 0.183 0
2.0 0 0.157 1.478 1.045 0
Asymmetric voluntary system (ϕ = 1/3) 0.989
0.5 0 0 0.399 0.183 –0.009
2.0 0.165 0 1.433 1.170 0.018
Symmetric voluntary system (ϕ = 1) 1.038
0.5 0.006 0 0.393 0.215 0
2.0 0.023 0.092 1.478 1.045 0
(i) The pure mandatory system is only displayed as a benchmark, with relative
efficiency 1. Note the unacceptably low old-age consumption of the myope: doL = 0.183.
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(ii) The mandatory pillar supplemented with an asymmetric voluntary pillar only
makes things a little bit worse because the matching rate is too low to help the myope
(ϕ = 1/3) and the ceiling on voluntary contribution is high enough (r¯ = 0.165) to
allow the far-sighted to appropriate all the benefits. The earmarked tax rate creates
a net transfer from the myopes to the far-sighted. The young-age consumption of the
former slightly diminishes, just to help raise the far-sighted’s old-age consumptions. The
pure mandatory pillar can achieve the same social welfare as the asymmetric voluntary
system with 1.1 percent lower wages.
(iii) The mandatory pillar supplemented with a symmetric voluntary pillar redresses
the injustice: the matching rate is raised to 1, while the ceiling is drastically lowered to
0.023. The myope’s old-age consumption rises now from doL = 0.183 to 0.215, the young-
age consumption drops from coL = 0.409 to 0.393, while c
o
H and d
o
H remain invariant.
The pure mandatory pillar can only achieve the welfare of the symmetric voluntary
system by increasing wages uniformly by 3.8 percent. Note, however, that this is the
same as a 1.2 + 1.2 = 2.4 percent point increase of the mandatory contribution rate!
4.2. Cap on the contribution base
In most countries, workers do not pay pension contributions after the earning above the
so-called contribution base cap, shortly cap. In the Introduction, we promised to model
a neglected function of the cap: it effectively limits the ratio of the contribution to the
earnings, reducing the presumed adverse efficiency impact of mandatory saving: this is
the basis of the present model. We shall see that in our specification, the cap has hardly
any welfare impact in the relevant interval but is socially superior to the capless case.
Our starting point is the cap w¯ and the covered total wage wˆ = min(w, w¯). Then the
contribution is equal to τwˆ. We introduce the covered net wage and the corresponding
benefit:
vˆ = (1− τ)wˆ and b = βvˆ.
We shall also need the effective contribution rate, defined as the ratio of contribution to
wage:
τ˜ =
τw¯
w
if w > w¯ and τ˜ = τ if w ≤ w¯.
Obviously, for a wage higher than the cap, the effective contribution rate is lower
than the statutory one: w > w¯ implies τ˜ < τ .
We only display the most important formulas. We should distinguish again two
cases: the saving intention is either (i) nonnegative or (ii) negative.
To determine the optimal saving, we need the Cobb–Douglas-lifetime utility function
U(w, δ, c, d) = log c+ µδ log d.
Inserting the consumption functions
c = w − τwˆ − s and d = βvˆ + ρµ−1s,
we obtain the derived utility function
U∗(w, δ, s) = log(w − τwˆ − s) + µδ log(βvˆ + ρµ−1s).
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Introducing the cap-dependent net earning w − τw¯ and taking the derivative by s and
equating it to zero; yields
1
v − s =
δρ
b+ µ−1ρs
.
Hence we have the following result.
Theorem 6. In a pension system with the cap-dependent net earning w− τw¯, the
optimal saving intention is
si =
δρv − b
(δ + µ−1)ρ
.
If δρv ≥ b, then si ≥ 0, i.e. so = si and do = δco. Otherwise, if δρv < b, then si < 0,
i.e. so = 0 and do > δco.
In our paternalistic framework, the government maximizes the expected value of
U∗[w, 1] = log(w − τw¯ − so) + µ log(βvˆ + ρµ−1so)
rather than EU∗[w, δ]. That is,
V (τ, w¯) = EU∗[w, 1].
We confine our numerical illustrations to the 2-type case. Input data: The com-
pounded discount factors for 30 years are δL = 0.1; and δH = 0.6 (annually δL(1) =
δ
1/30
L = 0.926.. and δH(1) = δ
1/30
H = 0.983..); while the interest factor is ρ = 2 (annually
ρ(1) = 21/30 = 1.0234..). By theoretical and numerical reasoning, the socially optimal
contribution rate τo = 0.333. Table 4 shows that the social welfare function increases
with the cap until wL and then it drops. The key to the solution is to be found in the
consumption of the lower paid: doL(w¯), which grows until w¯ reaches wL (italicized row),
beyond which it only reduces the possibilities of the high-earners.
Table 4. The impact of cap on the social welfare
L o w e a r n e r H i g h e a r n e r Social
young-age old-age young-age old-age welfare
Cap c o n s u m p t i o n function
w¯ coL d
o
L c
o
H d
o
H V
0.0 0.476 0.095 1.538 1.846 –1.033
. . . . . .
0.4 0.367 0.266 1.487 1.785 –0.881
0.5 0.334 0.333 1.474 1.769 –0.874
0.6 0.334 0.333 1.462 1.754 –0.878
. . . . . .
2 0.334 0.333 1.282 1.539 –0.944
Remark. τ∗ = 0.333, w¯∗ = 0.5.
The wages should be uniformly increased by 11.1 and 4.6 percent in the no-pension
or the no-cap pension system respectively to have as high social welfare as with the
socially optimally capped pension system.
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4.3. Redistribution with flexible labor supply
This is the classical model, where the two introductory models (Subsections 2.1–2.2) are
modified, unified and the third (Subsection 2.3) is generalized.9 Here the labor supply is
flexible and is influenced by the personal income tax rate and the forced saving for old-
age. To keep the model as simple as possible, there is no private saving and the personal
income tax θwl is copied from Subsection 2.1 but the basic income γ is extended to the
old. We recall some earlier notations and formulas: τ = contribution rate, θ = personal
income tax rate, t = τ + θ = transfer rate and t¯ = 1 − t = the net-of-transfer rate.
Furthermore, l = labor supply. The pension benefit in turn consists of two parts: flat
benefit γ and the proportional benefit βwl, where β is the so-called accrual rate (or
equivalently, marginal replacement rate) and wl is the total earning. Hence the total
benefit is b(wl) = γ + βwl. We display the consumption pair:
c = γ + t¯wl and d = γ + βwl.
Without proof, we give the necessary condition for individual optimality.
Theorem 7. The necessary condition for the optimal labor supply is
t¯w
γ + t¯wl
− ξ
T − l +
δµβw
γ + βwl
= 0.
With rearrangement, a quadratic equation is obtained:
a2l
2 + a1l + a0 = 0,
where
a2 = −(1 + ξ + δµ)t¯βw2,
a1 = t¯w(Tβw − γ)− ξw(γβ + t¯γ) + δµβw(t¯wT − γ),
and
a0 = t¯wTγ − ξγ2 + δµβwγT.
We shall consider two special cases: (i) the proportional pension system (P) without
redistribution: γ = 0 and (ii) the pure flat benefit system (F): β = 0. Here the optimal
labor supplies are as follows:
lP0 =
T
1 + ξ
< lP =
(1 + δµ)T
1 + ξ + δµ
< T and 0 < lFw =
T − ξγ/(t¯w)
1 + ξ
< lP0 ,
where lP0 is the labor supply of Feldstein’s myopes (δ = 0). The unified balance condition
is as follows:
tE(wl) = (1 + µ)γ + µβE(wl), i.e. γ = (1 + µ)−1(t− µβ)E(wl), t ≥ µβ.
We only illustrate the impact of wage rate inequality, i.e. reduce the ratio ω =
wH/wL from 4 to 1. It is to be expected that the socially optimal transfer rate is
9 Among the models surveyed, this is the closest to Cremer et al. (2008)!
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dropping along, but only numerical calculations, displayed in Table 5, give the measures:
namely the socially optimal transfer rate drops from 0.52 to 0.33 and through the rise
of labor supply, the average wage rises from 0.74 to 0.91. But it is quite surprising that
the optimal redistribution among workers disappears well before reaching wage rate
equality, namely slightly below ω = 2 (exactly at 1.8)! At the same time, the accrual
rate β∗ steeply rises and reaches the value of the optimal proportional system. We cite
Table 4 from Simonovits (2012d).
Table 5. The impact of earning inequality on the social optimum
L o w
Ratio of Low Transfer Basic Accrual Average worker pensioner
w a g e r a t e s rate income rate wage c o n s u m p t i o n
ω wL t
∗ γ∗ β∗ E(wl∗) c∗L d
∗
L
4 0.5 0.52 0.158 0.40 0.741 0.281 0.260
3 0.6 0.46 0.111 0.51 0.811 0.337 0.324
2 0.75 0.35 0.015 0.65 0.905 0.440 0.440
1 1 0.33 0.000 0.66 0.908 0.596 0.587
Remark. µ = 0.5, δL = 0.4 and δH = 0.7.
4.4. Underreporting wages
One of the most important problems of public economics, especially during transition
(from socialism to capitalism) is as follows: how to achieve income redistribution in such
a way that the lower income people do not starve and the higher income people do not
hide too much of their incomes? Using the tax morale, mentioned in the Introduction,
endogenizes underreporting of labor incomes. Excluding the old-age, we had already
been able to derive quite sharp analytical results in the generalization of Subsection 2.1
(cf. Simonovits, 2012b). But extending the analysis to the second stage, we have to be
content with more modest results.
We keep the notations of Subsection 4.3, except for wl is replaced by reported wage
v. We choose the simplest progressive tax system, where every worker pays a linear
earning tax θv and receives a lump-sum return ε. Thus the net tax is equal to θv − ε.
The pension benefit in turn consists of two parts: flat benefit α and the proportional
benefit βv, where β is the so-called accrual rate. Hence the total benefit is b(v) = α+βv.
In addition to forced savings via the pension system, workers also can save privately, its
value is denoted by s, there is no interest: ρ = 1. We display the consumption pair:
c = w − tv + ε− s and d = α+ βv + µ−1s.
In the spirit of the tax morale literature, we introduce the tax morale parameter m,
influencing the subjective utility of the worker underreporting his true earning w:
z(w,m, v) = m(log v − v/w).
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Due to the linear correction term, z(w,m, ·) has a maximum at v = w. In fact,
z′v(w,m, v) =
m
v
− m
w
> 0
if and only if 0 < v < w, i.e. the overreporting individual is not rational.
The other terms of the lifetime utility function are standard and have been intro-
duced in Section 3:
u1(c) = log c and u2(d) = δ log d.
In sum, the total individual utility function is
U(w,m, δ, c, d, v) = log c+m(log v − v/w) + µδ log d.
Executing the substitutions and equating the partial derivatives (with respect to wage
reporting and saving) to zero, yield the individual optimum. Because savings cannot
be negative, we must distinguish again between two cases: a) the saving intention is
nonnegative or b) negative. In the former case, the saving intention is realized (slack
credit constraint); in the latter case, the actual saving becomes zero (binding credit
constraint). We only consider here the former case.
Theorem 8. Under our assumptions, if the worker has a slack credit constraint,
then the individually optimal young-age consumption c is the positive root of the fol-
lowing quadratic equation:
h2c
2 + h1c+ h0 = 0, where t1 = t− µβ
and
h2 = m(1+µδ), h1 = t1(1+µδ)w+ t1mw−m(w+µα+ε), h0 = −t1w(w+µα+ε).
This individually optimal worker’s consumption defines the other components like
reported wage v.
To get rid of the mathematical difficulties of the tax balance equation, we assume
the existence of a positive net average tax a¯ = E(θv − ε). Furthermore, the individual
utility is enhanced by the utility of public goods, modeled as
q(a¯) = (1 + µ)κ log a¯,
where κ is the coefficient of relative utility of public goods to that of young-age con-
sumption.
At this point, we must consider the pension balance equation:
τEv = µEb(v).
We arrived to a relatively simple general equilibrium model mentioned in Section 3.
We display two numerical calculations, where the tax morale is relatively weak and
strong, respectively: a dark grey economy with m = 0.5 and a light grey economy with
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m = 2. For the relative utility parameter κ = 1/3, we determine the socially optimal
values of the transfer system.
Unlike in light grey economy, in the dark grey economy, the socially optimal basic
income is always zero, therefore Table 6 has one column less than Table 7. Citing
Table 4 in Simonovits (2009b) we see that the higher the flat component, the lower the
average reported wage and consequently, the lower the social welfare, assuming that
the government chooses socially optimal tax rates. Repeating our warning again: there
is not much sense in differences between the values of social welfare functions, rather
we must measure the decline by consumption equivalence. For example, let e > 1 be
such a scalar that by multiplying both types’ wages with it, the social welfare of a flat
component α = 0.2 becomes identical to that of the original proportional system. We
obtain e = 1.03, i.e. the economy should have wages uniformly higher by 3 percent to
achieve the original welfare of the proportional system in the foregoing flat system.
Table 6. An optimal system with a given flat benefit, dark grey economy, m = 0.5
Contri- Marginal Average
Flat bution Tax replace- Reported net Social
benefit rate rate ment rate wage tax welfare
α τo θo βo v¯(P ) a¯ V
0.00 0.22 0.28 0.440 0.547 0.102 –3.108
0.04 0.35 0.29 0.620 0.500 0.097 –3.113
0.08 0.37 0.29 0.568 0.466 0.090 –3.124
0.12 0.36 0.29 0.447 0.439 0.085 –3.140
0.16 0.36 0.29 0.331 0.411 0.079 –3.161
0.20 0.35 0.29 0.181 0.385 0.074 –3.185
Turning to the light grey economy (Table 5 in Simonovits 2009b), the purely propor-
tional system is less efficient than the optimally redistributive one. In our specification,
the average reported wage is also a decreasing function of flat component, but its im-
pact is weak enough that the proportional benefit disappear around α = 0.28, before
the system reached the optimum at α = 0.32. In the purely proportional system, wages
should be increased uniformly by 2.1 percent to achieve the same social welfare as in
the social optimum with basic benefit α = 0.32.
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Table 7. An optimal system with a given flat benefit, light grey economy, m = 2
Contri- Net Marginal Average
Flat bution tax Basic replace- Reported net Social
benefit rate rate income ment rate wage tax welfare
α τo θo ε βo v¯(F ) a¯(F ) V (F )
0.00 0.26 0.40 0.10 0.520 0.732 0.128 –4.810
· · · · · ·
0.20 0.26 0.36 0.07 0.239 0.712 0.124 –4.773
0.24 0.21 0.27 0 0.094 0.735 0.132 –4.772
0.28 0.20 0.27 0 0.013 0.724 0.130 –4.767
0.32 0.22 0.28 0 0 0.707 0.132 –4.755
0.36 0.25 0.26 0 0 0.703 0.122 –4.760
0.40 0.28 0.24 0 0 0.699 0.112 –4.773
5. Original specifications
As was mentioned in the Introduction, in displaying the specific models in Section 4, to
approach a common framework, we have frequently deviated from the original specifi-
cations. Here we present some original ones, which shed some light on the sensitivity of
the models as well.
5.1. Discounted Leontief utility and cap
As is known, the additive discounted utility function, introduced by Samuelson (1937)
and specified as CRRA, contains the discounted Cobb–Douglas and the undiscounted
Leontief utility functions as special cases. But following the spirit of Shane, Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue (2002), we gave up the additivity assumption, and to help analytical
discussion of the contribution cap, originally we chose a specific utility function, called
discounted Leontief utility function:
U(w, δ, c, d) = min(δc, d).
Note that this lifetime utility function is not age-additive, and surprisingly it is the
young- rather than the old-age consumption which is discounted. Note, however, that
for any positive saving, at the optimum, δc = d, i.e. the lower the discount factor, the
lower the old-age consumption. An additional advantage of this specification lies in that
for reasonable choice of the contribution rate, c > d, i.e. U(w, δ, c, d) = d, yielding a
simple social welfare function: V = Ed. Simonovits (2013) conjectured that the unitary
replacement rate is socially optimal.
We only display the most important formulas. Again, we should distinguish two
cases: the saving intention is (i) nonnegative or (ii) negative.
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Ad (i). At the optimum, δc∗ = d∗, i.e. δv − δs = b + µ−1ρs yielding the saving
intention si = (δv − b)/(δ + µ−1ρ), which is realized of and only if δ ≥ δτ = µ−1τwˆ/v.
Then c∗1 = (ρv + µb)/(µδ + ρ).
Ad (ii). If si < 0, then s∗2 = 0, i.e. c
∗
2 = v and d
∗
2 = b.
Here we confine our numerical illustrations to the 3-type case. Input data: fL = 0.7;
fE = 0.25 and fH = 0.05, wages: wL = 0.7; wE = 1.3 and wH = 1.7. The compounded
interest factors for 30 years are δL = 0.215; δE = 0.545 and δH = 0.97; at annual level:
δL(1) = 0.977; δE(1) = 0.988 and δH(1) = 0.999. The socially optimal contribution
rate τ∗ = 0.333 and the corresponding cap w¯∗ = wE . Table 2 of Simonovits (2012a) is
reproduced here.
Table 8. The impact of cap on the social welfare, 3 types, Leontief
Medium High Social
Cap c o n s u m p t i o n welfare
w¯ doE d
o
H V = Ed
1.0 0.666 1.198 0.626
1.1 0.733 1.185 0.641
1.2 0.799 1.172 0.655
1.3 0.866 1.159 0.670
1.4 0.866 1.146 0.668
1.5 0.866 1.133 0.666
1.6 0.866 1.120 0.664
1.7 0.866 1.132 0.666
Remark. τ∗ = 0.333, w¯∗ = 1.3.
Note that raising the cap from 1 to the medium wage 1.3, the weighted increase in
doE is greater than the weighted decrease in d
o
H . Above wE , the further rise in w¯ only
diminishes doH , without raising d
o
E .
5.2. Pareto-distribution
Though in our survey, the earning distribution is generally discrete, with two or three
types, now we present a more realistic, continuous earning distribution named after
Wilfredo Pareto (cf. Diamond and Saez, 2011). The distribution function is given as
F (w) =
∫ w
wm
f(ω) dω = 1− wσmw−σ, where w ≥ wm,
σ > 1 and wm > 0 is the minimal earning. Normalizing the average wage to 1, the
minimum wage is wm = (σ − 1)/σ.
Selected numerical values are displayed in Table 9. Note that the lower 50 percent of
earners have only 25 percent of the total earnings, while the upper 3 percent of earners
have 17 percent.
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Table 9. Pareto-probabilities and covered wage shares as a function of the cap
Earning cap Probability Covered wage share
w¯ F (w¯) P(w < w¯)E(w|w < w¯)
0.707 0.500 0.250
1.0 0.750 0.500
1.5 0.889 0.667
2.0 0.938 0.750
2.5 0.960 0.800
3.0 0.972 0.833
4.0 0.984 0.875
Returning to the cap, we show the result obtained for Pareto-distribution and dis-
counted Leontief utility function. We specify an appropriate discount factor–wage func-
tion
δ(w) = (δm − δM )eη(wm−w) + δM ,
where δm and δM are the minimal and the maximal discount factors, respectively, while
η measures the strength of the dependence on wage. Let δm = 0.25 (annually 0.955,
quite low); δM = 1 and η = 0.5.
Simonovits (2013) investigated the optimal choice of the contribution rate without
imposing a cap. For our parameterization, the maximal contribution rate is the social
optimum: τ∗ = τ¯ . According to Table 10, the social welfare achieved for the contribution
rates lower than 0.17 is inferior to the no-pension’s!
Table 10. The welfare impact of the contribution rate without cap, Pareto
Contribution rate 10× Social welfare Expected saving
τ 10U Es
0.000 4.35 0.109
0.100 4.14 0.053
0.120 4.10 0.043
0.170 4.34 0.024
0.200 4.64 0.016
0.300 6.07 0.002
0.333 6.67 0.000
Turning to the issue of optimal cap, Table 11 shows that the cap hardly influences the
social welfare in the relevant interval [2.5,4.5], though its total lack (last row) diminishes
the welfare by 0.7 percent.
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Table 11. The welfare impact of the cap, Pareto
Cap 10× Social Welfare Average saving
w¯ 10U Es
2.5 6.690 0.017
3.0 6.704 0.015
3.5 6.709 0.013
4.0 6.709 0.012
4.5 6.708 0.010
5.0 6.705 0.009
. . . . . .
∞ 6.660 0.000
Remark. τ = 1/3.
5.3. Pension credit
This model generalizes the model with flexible labor supply (Subsection 4.3) in two
dimensions: it includes private saving and replaces the linear “flat plus” pension benefit
by the nonlinear pension credit. This also generalizes the means-tested pension.
The basic pension is a universal transfer, regardless of the individual’s other incomes.
The means-tested benefit is only given to those whose other income fall below the
minimum, and this insufficient income is topped up to the minimum. It can be seen
that due to its size, the “basic plus” system may undermine incentives to contribute;
while the means-tested system creates a poverty trap.10 The pension credit is a clever
combination of the two special systems: it pays full basic benefit for zero income and
zero flat pension for sufficiently high income. In between, the basic income is smoothly
reduced by a share of the other incomes.
To avoid repetition, here we only present the elementary part, without dealing with
optimality. It is assumed that a given share, say ε (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1) of the proportional
pension βv is deducted from the flat part. Denote by x+ the positive part of x, i.e.
x+ = x for x ≥ 0 and x+ = 0 for x < 0. Then the pension credit benefit is given by
b(v) = [γ − εβv]+ + βv.
It is worth rewriting this formula:
b(v) = max[γ + (1− ε)βv, βv].
In words: the benefit is equal to the maximum of the following two quantities: a) the
flat benefit + the reduced proportional benefit, and b) the proportional benefit.
We shall work with three types and the following shares: fL = 0.5, fE = 0.3 and
fH = 0.2 and fix β so that the flat benefit be half of the average benefit. Table 12
10 Following Feldstein (1985), this was the starting point of Feldstein (1987), which initiated the
whole research direction!
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cites Table 2 from Simonovits (2012c). It shows that the flat system is very expensive
(Eb = 0.6), while the means-tested system assures too low a benefit even to the average
earner (bE = 0.3). The pension credit is not too expensive (Eb = 0.458) and it assures
an acceptable minimum benefit (bL = 0.375).
Table 12. Pension credit, α = 0.3
Proportion Full Proportional Conditional Total Average
of credit wage p e n s i o n
1− ε vi βvi α+ (1− ε)βvi bi b¯
0 0.5 0.150 0.300 0.300
1 0.300 0.300 0.300
2.25 0.675 0.300 0.675
means-tested 0.375
0.5 0.5 0.150 0.375 0.375
1 0.300 0.450 0.450
2.25 0.675 0.638 0.675
pension credit 0.458
1 0.5 0.150 0.450 0.450
1 0.300 0.600 0.600
2.25 0.675 0.975 0.975
flat 0.6
6. Conclusions
We have presented a general elementary framework within which many interesting spe-
cial transfer (tax and pension) models can be investigated. The joint framework is
the two-overlapping-generation model, where the individuals work in the first stage
of their adult life and retire for the second. In every model of this family, the gov-
ernment operates a balanced linear or piecewise linear transfer systems, possibly with
caps. The individuals optimize their lifetime utilities by choosing paying voluntary pen-
sion contributions, their reported earnings, reacting with increased savings to lowered
caps, supplying more labor. The individuals are typically shortsighted, therefore left
for themselves they would save too little, supply too little labor and hide a large part of
their earnings. The paternalistic government tries to steer them in the good direction
through incentives. Due to the linearity (or piecewise linearity) of the transfer rules,
their optimal parameter values can easily determined. The analysis would be much
more difficult if genuinely nonlinear transfer systems were considered.
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List of symbols
Common symbols
w = total wage (cost) δ = discount factor
L = low H = high
T = labor time l = labor supply
τ = contribution rate θ = tax rate
t = transfer rate t¯ = net-of-transfer rate
c = young-age consumption d = old-age consumption
b = pension s = saving (i superscript=intention)
µ = length ratio ρ = interest factor
u = U = utility function V = social welfare function
f = relative frequency E = expected value
β = accrual rate
Income redistribution under flexible labor income supply
γ = basic income ξ = relative utility of leisure
Framework
p = individual characteristics q = government characteristics
e = relative efficiency P = combined characteristics
u1 = young-age utility u2 = old-age utility
T = transfer function x = decision
L = individual Lagrange-function L = social Lagrange-function
λ = individual Lagrange-multiplier ν = social Lagrange-multiplier
Voluntary pension
r = voluntary contribution r¯ = cap on voluntary contribution
α = matching rate σ = CRRA-index
γ = generalized discount factor
Cap on the contribution base
w¯ = cap wˆ = covered total earning
vˆ = covered net earning v = net earning
Flexible labor supply
ω = wage rate ratio γ = basic income
F = flat system P = proportional system
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Reported earning and redistribution
v = reported earning m = tax morale
z = morale utility a = net tax
κ = coefficient of utility of public goods E = medium type
α = basic income ε = basic pension
Pareto-distribution
f = density function F = distribution function
σ = density index wm = minimum wage
wN = upper earning wK = representative earning
δm = minimal δ δM = maximal δ
η = coefficient of discount factor
Pension credit
ε = exemption rate v=earning
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